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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL TREATIES AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
D. BARLOW BURKE*
In a governmental system such as ours, where certain powers are delegated to
the federal government and others are reserved to the states, it is inevitable that
there should be a borderline between the two where overlapping occurs. This is
the situation when federal control of foreign affairs conflicts with the police power
of the states. Interesting problems of constitutional law and of international law
as judicially applied are involved in this conflict and it is with cases illustrative of
this contest that this paper will deal.
Much of the official intercourse of the United States with foreign nations is
embodied in treaties. It is when the provisions of these treaties clash with what a
state deems to be its sovereign rights that the courts are called upon to decide which
right is supreme.
By express provision of the United States Constitution, a treaty is superior to
a state constitution. Article VI, Section 2 of the former instrument reads: "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Therefore, insofar as the provisions of a state constitution
and a treaty are conflicting, the latter will control.
In the course of a very extended opinion rendered in the case of In Re Parrott,
I Fed. 481 (1880), Judge Sawyer of the United States Circuit Court of California
said, "The states have surrendered the treaty-making power to the general government, and vested it in the president and senate, and when duly exercised by the
president and senate, the treaty resulting is the supreme law of the land, to which
not only state laws but state constitutions are in express terms subordinated."
An early case to the same effect is that of Gordon v. Kerr.' This was an action
of ejectment to recover 299 acres of land located in Pennsylvania. In the course of
his charge to the jury, Justice Washington, sitting as a Circuit Justice, said, "Ever.
that constitution (The Constitution of Pennsylvania) may yield to the treaty of
peace (between the United States and Great Britain) which is supreme. The fifth
article stipulates that Congress should earnestly recommend to the states a revision
of their confiscation laws, so as to render them consistent with justice and equity,
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etc., and should also recommend to them the restitution of confiscated estates ...
If the states thought proper to restore, their power to do it grew out of this treaty;
and so far neutralized any article of their constitution, which prohibited, in other
cases, the exercise of such right".
A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all of the United
States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way. If the constitution of a
state (which is the fundamental law of the state and paramount to its legislative
body) must yield to a treaty, it cannot be questioned that an act of the state legislature, which is of less power, must also yield. Thus, a statute of any state, escheating lands of intestate aliens, where a treaty has been entered into between the
United States and the aliens' country, is void if the terms of the statute controvert
the treaty. This is so since the treaty, like the federal constitution, is the supreme
law of the land.
The case of Hauenstein v. Lynham2 is ar illustration of this. This was an
action by citizens and residents of Virginia, heirs of a person who had died leaving property which had been adjudged to have escheated to the state, to recover the
proceeds of such property. The Virginia courts held that, under Virginia law, the
proceeds of the property sought to be recovered belonged to the state; the United
States Supreme Court reversed this judgment, holding that the Virginia law in
question conflicted with a treaty between the United States and the Swiss Confederation. In its opinion, the court says, "It remains to consider the effect of the
treaty thus construed upon the rights of the parties. That the laws of the state,
irrespective of the treaty, would put the fund into her coffers, is no objection to
the right or the remedy claimed by the plaintiffs in error. The efficacy of the
treaty is declared and guaranteed by the constitution of the United States."
The above case should be sharply distinguished from In Re Anderson's Estae,3
which holds that a state statute imposing an inheritance tax on estates passing to
non-resident aliens where none is imposed on residents does not conflict with the
seventh article in the treaty between the United States and Denmark; 4 "The United
States and his Danish Majesty mutually agree, that no higher or other duties,
charges or taxes of any kind, shall be levied in the territories or dominions of either
party, upon any personal property, money or effects of their respective citizens or
subjects, on the removal of the same from their territories or dominions reciprocally
either upon the inheritance of such property, money or effects, or otherwise, than
are or shall be payable in each state, upon the same when removed by a citizen or
subject of such state respectively."
In the Anderson case, a citizen of Denmark, domiciled in Iowa, died intestate,
leaving as his only heir at law his mother, a citizen and resident of Denmark. This
estate consisted entirely of personal property. The court held that the tax imposed
2100 U. S.483 (1880).
8218 N. W. 140 (1928).
48 Stat. 340.
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by the Iowa statute, which tax was alleged to be contrary to the treaty provision set
forth above, was a tax not on property or estate, but rather upon the succession or
right to take by succession. In other words, a death or excise tax is held not to be a
tax on property so as to violate the express provisions of a treaty between the
'United States and a foreign country, when the property in question passes from a
resident alien to a non-resident alien. This case illustrates that state legislation
may in some instances vary or alter the clear spirit and intention of a treaty without
violating its strict letter, and thus in fact make the state law superior to a federal
treaty. The court points out, however, that if the intestate's mother had been a
resident of Iowa, even though not a citizen of that state, the statutory provision
imposing the tax would not have applied. This case has been overruled by the
decision in Neilson v. Johnston,6 which held that the statutory provision in question
violated the treaty with Denmark. The reasoning of the court in the Anderson case
nevertheless remains interesting. In the Neilson case Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Stone, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court said, inter alia: ". . .as
the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative power of
the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted by any
necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation and when so ascertained
must prevail over inconsistent state enactments." This case involved a dispute between the administrator of the estate of a citizen of Denmark, resident in Iowa at
the time of his death, and the taxing authorities of that state. The administrator
claimed the benefit of the foregoing treaty clause while the state claimed that the
estate was subject to the local inheritance tax law. The court, in the language of
Justice Stone, asserted the prevalence of the treaty.
A quite recent case similar in facts and principle was that of Engen v. State
Bank of Harvard,6 decided in 1929. This case was decided by the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, and concerned the effect of a treaty between the United States and
Norway. The treaty provided, inter alia: "The subjects of the contracting parties
in the respective states may freely dispose of their goods and effects, either by testament, donation or otherwise, in favor of such persons as they think proper; and
their heirs, in whatever place they shall reside, shall receive the succession even ab
intestato either in person or by their attorney."
The question is; can the terms of the Nebraska homestead law limit or restrict
the operation of this treaty? The court answered this question in the negative. The
Nebraska homestead statute imposed certain restraints on the alienation of land
and certain conveyances executed by Christian Knudson, an alien domiciled in
Nebraska, were sought to be set aside as contrary to the homestead law. The court
said that the treaty rights of aliens must be enforced by the state courts without regard to statutory provisions. Therefore, though the provisions of the homestead act
5279 U. S. 47.
6118 Neb. 105, 223 N. W. 664 (1929).
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would apply to citizens of Nebraska and its limitations would be effective as to
them, they cannot be effective as to domiciled aliens whose status is governed by
treaty.
A case arising out of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 gave Mr. Justice
Field, of the United States Supreme Court, an opportunity to discuss the conflict
between state and federal governments in the realm of foreign affairs. Although
the case of Chae Chan Ping v. U. S. 7 was primarily concerned with a treaty and a
subsequent and conflicting act of Congress, the opinion written by Mr. Justice Field
discussed federal and state relations in an illuminating fashion. "While under our
Constitution and form of government", wrote the Justice, "the great mass of local
matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States in their relation to
foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers
which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire terri8
Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Cohen v. Virginia, he
tory ..
continues: "The Constitution and laws of a state, so far as they are repugnant to
the Constitution and laws of the United States are absolutely void. These States
are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of on-e great empirefor some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate." Justice Field in
his opinion also quotes Mr. Justice Bradley in the case of Knox v. Lee9 as follows:
"The United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and
the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is
vested with powers over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace and
negotiations and intercourses with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the
State governments

.

.

.".

The opinion of Justice Field continues in the following

words: "The control of local matters being left to the local authorities and national
matters being intrusted to the government of the Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates and
varied interests has b'een happily solved. For local interests, the several States of
the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power."
Next, the question arises, does a treaty have superior sanctity over an act of
Congress, where the latter is subsequent to the former in time? The answer to this
question is in the negative, for it has been authoritatively held that where Congress
passes a law, which in substance changes, modifies or repeals an earlier treaty between the United States and a foreign country, such law is valid and will govern in
place of the treaty which has thus been wholly or partly superseded. In the Head
Money Cases,10 Mr. Justice Miller said: "So far as a treaty made by the United
7130 U. S. 581 (1889).
86 Wheat. 264 (1821).
912 Wall. 457 (1871).

10112 U. S. 580 (1884).
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States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the
courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification or repeal." Where, however, the subsequent federal statute
contains no explicit or substantial repealer of the prior treaty, the treaty is not considered to be repealed, as was held in Frank Cook v. U. S.11
The case of

J.

Ribas y Hijo v. U. S.12' illustrates the principle that a treaty

supersedes an earlier conflicting act of Congress. This action was brought in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, by a Spanish corporation to recover the value of the use of a merchant vessel taken by the United States
in the port of Ponce, Puerto Rico, when that city was captured by the United States
Army and Navy in 1898. The plaintiffs based their claim on a United States
statute of 1887, which provided for the bringing of suits against the United States
government. The court points out that whatever rights the plaintiffs might have
had under this act were rendered nugatory by the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, which treaty was ratified in 1899. In the words of Mr.
Justice Harlan: "We may add that 'even if the Act of March, 1887, standing alone,
could be construed as authorizing a suit of this kind the plaintiff must fail; for it
is well settled that in case of a conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty,
each being equally the supreme law of the land, the one last in date must prevail in
the courts." Here the treaty is last in date. If the situation is reversed and the act
of Congress comes later than the treaty, the principle is equally applicable and the
provisions of the treaty that conflict with the later law will fall.
It is important to observe that the courts do not favor repeals by implication
and only when the two are undoubtedly incompatible will 'the later treaty be construed as repealing the earlier act of Congress.
Returning to the 'matter of federal treaty-making power and state sovereignty,
we come to the extremely important case of Missouri v. Holland.13 The decision in
this case is founded on a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent
a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act on the ground that the law is an unconstitutional interference with
the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the federal constitution and that the threatened acts'of the defendant invade the sovereign rights of
the states. The act provided for the enforcement of the terms of a treaty between
the United States and Great Britain, dealing with the subject of protection to be
given by both nations to specified classes of migratory birds.
Mr. Justice Holmes in his opinion points out that an earlier act of Congress
that attempted by itself and not following a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the states had been held bad by a United States District Court in
11288 U. S. 100 (1933).
12194 U. S. 315 (1903).
13252 U. S. 416 (1920).
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the case of United States v. Slauver.1 The arguments in that case were to the
effect that migratory birds were owned by the 'states in their sovereign capacity for
the ben-efit of their people, and the control was such that Congress could not constitutionally displace it. In the Holland case, however, the court refuses to accept
the Shauver case as a true test of the treaty power of the federal government.
Justice Holmes declares that "it is obvious that there are matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with
but that a treaty followed by such an act could", thus distinguishing between the
two cases. In the Holland case, the act of Congress can be sustained so long as the
treaty itself is valid on the ground that it is a necessary and proper means of executing the powers of the federal government. On the question of the treaty's
validity, Justice Holmes expresses the opinion that "the treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment". The Tenth Amendment, it will be remembered, provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Justice Holmes decides that the treaty is not forbidden either expressly or
impliedly by the terms of that amendment. He says: "No doubt the great body of
private relations usually fall within the control of'the State, but a treaty may ove&ride its power. . . . Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is
involved.' It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. . . .We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the government
to sit by while a food supply is cut off 'and the protectors of our forests and our
crops destroyed. . . . We are of the opinion that the treaty and statute must be
upheld." Of similar import is the question as to whether the power of the President to conducttforeign affairs is subject to the limitation of the states' reserved
powers. Space does not permit a complete discussion of this topic but a recent case
is sufficiently in point to be illustrative of the general rule. Congress in '1934
authorized the President to forbid the sale of arms to'Bolivia and Paraguay, then
engaged in the bloody Chaco war. Pursuant to this grant of authority, the President placed an embargo on such shipments which was violated by the CurtissWright Export Corporation. The company defended its action on the ground that
Congress had' illegally delegated legislative power to the executive.

In the case of United States v. Curtiss-lWrig/4 Export Corporation,15 the

Supreme Court held that the reservation of powers to the states, as contained in the
Tenth Amendment, applied only to internal or domestic affairs. The power to
conduct*negotiations and dealings with foreign governments was solely a federal
power and was exclusively vested in the executive branch of the federal government.
14214 Fed. Rep. 154 (1914).
15229 U. S. 304 (1936).
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Coming now to the question of the effect of a municipal ordinance upon a
treaty, we find that the conclusion is in conformity with the above decisions regarding state statutes. This is the logical result, since municipal corporations are
16
but agents of the state which created them. In the case of Asakura v. Seattle it
was held that an ordinance of the city of Seattle, Washington, contravening a
treaty between the United States and Japan was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Butler said: "The treaty is binding within the State of Washington. The rule of equality established by it cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of th'e United States
by municipal ordinances or state laws."
A study of the cases, however, convinces the student that despite the positive
declarations made in the opinions cited, all judges are not agreed as to thv absolute
supremacy of a treaty over conflicting state laws. There have been eminent judges
who seriously question the right of the federal government to do by treaty what it
may not do by statute, that is, to regulate matters reserved to the states by the federal constitution. In the License Cases,17 Mr. Justice Daniel, 'delivering a dissenting
opinion, expresses his thought on the subject as follows: "Every power delegated
to the federal government must be expounded in coincidence with a perfect right
in the States to all that they have not delegated; in coincidence, too, with the possession of every power and right necessary for their existence and preservation.
.. . Laws of the United States, in order to be binding, must be within the legitimate powers vested by the Constitution. Treaties, to be valid, must be made within
the scope of the same powers. .

.

. A treaty, no more than an ordinary statute, can

arbitrarily cede away any one'right of a State or of any citizen of a State."
Two years later, in a dissenting opinion delivered in the Passenger Cases,1 s
Mr. Chief Justice Taney declared that the States have the absolute right to decide
who shall or shall not have the right to reside within their respective boundaries.
He wrote: "For if the treaty stipulation before referred to can receive the construction given to it in the argument, and has that commanding power claimed for it
over the states, then the emancipated slaves -of the West Indies have at this hour
the absolute right to reside, hire houses and traffic and trade throughout the
Southern States, in spite of any state law to the contrary. .

.

. It will hardly be said

that such a power was granted to the general government in th' confidence that it
would not be abused. .

.

. And I cannot imagine any power more unnecessary to

the general government and at the same time more dangerous and full of peril to
the States."
Thus the eminent Chief Justice questions the absolute supremacy of a federal
treaty over state law, and though his opinion is in the nature of obiter dicta, it is
weighty and entitled to mature consideration.
16265 U. S. 332 (1924).
175 How. 504 (1847).
187 How. 283 (1849).
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Matters of policy sometimes determine whether the federal governmLent will
insist upon the absolute supremacy of a treaty. For many years there was ill feeling
in the state of California toward the Japanese immigrants who settled there. In
1907 and 1908, numerous Japanese school children were barred from the public
schools and were required to attend separate schools, in distinct violation of the
rights which had been secured to Japanese residents of the United States by treaty
between the two nations. The United States government held that it was empowered to compel the state of California to observe the provisions of the treaty and
refrain from the discrimination against the Japanese, but did not press this claim
due to the hostile sentiment not only in California but also in other states. In the
case of Baldwin v. Franks,19 the attitude of the federal government was somewhat
similar in dealing with a situation that involved discrimination against the'Chinese.
The Supreme Court of the United States held in that case that'Congress has the
power, under the federal constitution, to provide for the punishment of persons
guilty of depriving the Chinese subjects residing in the United States of'any of the
rights, privileges, immunities or exemptions guaranteed to them by the Treaty of
November 17, 1880, but that Congress had not made such provision in'the laws
sought to be enforced. Thus the federal government sidestepped the responsibility
of enforcing treaty provisions which were binding on the federal and state govern-,
ments as the supreme law of the land.
Too frequently the United States government has found itself in the embarrassing position of being unable to afford adequate protection to domiciled aliens
who were the victims of mob violence within some state where racial prejudice and
animosity was pitted against them. Here the clash between 'the theory of the
supremacy of federal treaties and the police power of the state became most marked.
Foreign governments have been unable to understand why the Federal government
has refrained from giving the protection to their nationals which it has guaranteed
to them by treaty solemnly entered into and duly ratified.
In 1922, the United States government declined to be a party to international
agreements looking to a suppression of the white slave traffic on the ground that
to enter into such treaties would be an infringement upon the rights reserved to the
states. This is but one of the anomalous situations that our federal form of government has created in the field of foreign affairs. Dual sovereignty serves many an
admirable purpose, and is the keystone of our constitutional system. Nevertheless,
in the important area of external relations, it is sometimes the source of vexatious
misunderstanding.
PHILADELPHIA, PA.
19120 U. S. 678 (1886).
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